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Orientation: Seeing and Sensing Rhetorically
Megan Poole

Abstract
Many visual terms exist in Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical schema, yet the optical implications of
such terms remain largely unconsidered by rhetorical scholars. This study presents Burke’s
orientation as both a method of seeing and a way of uncovering rhetoric’s relationship to
sensation. Burkean orientation—deriving from ophthalmology and Gestalt psychology—brings
into focus three practices of studying the senses in rhetoric: attending to lived experience,
considering sensation as elemental to rhetorical work, and practicing rhetorical criticism attuned
to the entrenchments and slips of the senses. Engaging the biology of vision reveals sensation as
connective tissue between nonsymbolic motion and symbolic action.
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Orientation: Seeing and Sensing Rhetorically
Subject to double images and left to wonder which image is “real” and which is a
phantasm, individuals with diplopia often detail a disorienting experience—for Kenneth Burke,
that disorientation was sensorially and theoretically transformative. Burke began seeing double
in 1980, and just under a year later, near the end of an illustrative career, he would remark that
“perspective,” specifically the act of seeing double through “perspective by incongruity,” was
“the essence of [my] whole business” (qtd. in Skodnick 10). The adage that “a way of seeing is
also a way of not seeing” (Burke, Permanence and Change 49) had been popularized among
rhetorical critics by that time, but when Burke’s perspectival theories became actual in 1980, he
realized that the sensory act of seeing—not vision as a metaphorical or abstract concept, but
bodily, emplaced sight—was the core of his life’s work. Many Burkean terms, such as trained
incapacity and terministic screens, could be examined for their optical implications, but vision in
Burke’s rhetorical schema is here presented through orientation, a touchstone concept in
Permanence and Change and a term that has recently re-emerged in posthumanist (Mays) and
new materialist (Ahmed, “Orientations Matter”) scholarship. Traditionally interpreted by
scholars of rhetoric as bodily habits that construct a certain way of being in the world or as a
theoretical lens used to analyze artifacts, orientation, at least as researched by Burke and
presented in Permanence and Change, derives from optical science and the study of how the
biology of vision can bring unconscious biases to the forefront of attention. Orientation as
seeing—and reorientation as seeing double—reveal much about rhetoric’s relationship to
sensation, about how non-symbolic motion is glued to symbolic action through sensing and the
orienting of self toward world.
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Burke’s belief that the essence of his rhetorical contribution revolved around sight,
vision, and orientation has been largely unconsidered by rhetorical scholars. Exceptions among
rhetorical scholars include Scott R. Stroud who has traced how orientations determine an
organism’s relation to its environment (48; 55) and become ossified into ways of interpreting the
world (60). Ann George describes orientations as “interpretative lenses,” but is careful to cite
Burke’s insistence that orientations are “real” and not mere conceptual apparatuses (117). To get
at this “realness,” I propose that rhetorical scholars consider orientation through its optical roots,
as seeing and sensing rhetorically. This study of orientation opens up how this particular sensory
process comes to mean, an examination that makes vision less abstract and less objective. Vision
is rhetorical, then, not only when critics analyze how viewers interact with static artifacts, but
also through the everyday process of seeing.
Tracing sensation’s role in reorientation has particular applicability for studies in visual
rhetorics and new materialist rhetorics. These two subfields meet most explicitly in rhetoric
scholar Laurie E. Gries’s Still Life with Rhetoric, in which new materialisms merge with visual
rhetorics through the study of how “visual things circulate and acquire power” (85) and thus
differentially come to mean as they “enter into material relations with humans, technologies, and
other entities” (11). Other landmark studies expand notions of the viewer, theorizing how images
train viewers to see in certain ways. In Making Photography Matter, visual rhetoric and
photography scholar Cara Finnegan studies viewers’ responses to photographs to determine that
“viewers are not passive spectators with no capacity for agency” (7) but rather they develop
rhetorical awareness through historical and technological pedagogies of sight. Zeroing in on the
viewer, rhetoric scholar Debra Hawhee analyzes the sensory and conceptual mechanisms by
which “words . . . can stand in for or facilitate vision” (“Looking” 139), an encounter that she
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calls “rhetorical vision.” By concluding her study with a nod to neuroscience, Hawhee implicitly
raises the question of how images work biologically. My approach to Burkean orientation turns
even more fully to the rhetorical valences of sight by showing how the materiality of vision
foregrounds sensation as a cornerstone of visual rhetorics.
Burke’s notion of image has less to do with how material or mental images have
rhetorical effect and more to do with the rhetoricity of vision. By rhetoricity of vision I mean that
seeing is an integral part of interpretation. In other words, stressing the act of seeing as much as
what is seen exposes the deep roots of bias, showing how ways of seeing become rhetorical
processes that are not always consciously employed. To get at this unconscious bias, I engage the
biology of vision via Burke’s concept of orientation. Doing so requires following Burke in
understanding vision as biological, not solely conceptual. As vision loses its abstraction, three
elements for the study of image in rhetoric come into focus: an attention to lived experience, a
heightened sensitivity to sensation as elemental to rhetorical work, and the practice of senseinflected rhetorical criticism that identifies the entrenchments and slips of the senses.
Although I explore these three modes of image-encounter in rhetoric through a canonical
figure, I do so in an unconventional way: rather than finding the rhetorical in the scientific, I use
the scientific to identify the rhetorical underpinnings of orientation. Such a methodology relies
upon Burke’s forays into the biology and sensory experiences of vision, which lead him to:
Gestalt psychology, a modern school of thought that emerged to examine the neurology of
perception, and the work of German ophthalmologist Hermann von Helmholtz. This argument
unfolds in three parts. First, Gestalt reveals how “characters” emerge from lived, experiential
encounters with the material world to help interpret those encounters. Second, Helmholtz reveals
how sensation accrues meaning in its own semiotic way, informing and recursively altering
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humans’ symbol-systems. Finally, Burkean perspective by incongruity reveals how critics might
disrupt this sensory-interpretative process and allow individuals to see otherwise. In writing
about the fallibility of the senses, Burke hoped to disrupt humankind’s reliance on automatic
interpretation. Recovering this vision-oriented orientation helps to discern how vision is a
material, substantial, and vibrant element of rhetorical processes.
Defining Orientation through Gestalt
Orientation is not exclusively a Burkean term. In the wake of new materialisms and other
posthumanist concerns, orientation is making its way to the forefront of scholarly consideration.
In “Orientations Matter,” feminist scholar Sara Ahmed defines orientation as the bodily and
material turning toward an object that is dependent on the background that enables one to make
that turn (239). Ahmed uses the example of a writing table: gender is not in the table itself, but is
woven into the background that informs and makes the table. In another description, Ahmed
explains: “To be oriented is also to be turned toward certain objects, those that help us find our
way” (Queer Phenomenology 1). Connecting Burke’s rhetoric to posthuman thought in Kenneth
Burke + The Posthuman, rhetoric scholar Chris Mays recovers orientation to argue that texts,
too, have agency. As writers find their way through revision, Mays suggests that “orientation
illuminates our understanding of the way that writing creates a crystallized perspective” (69),
committing writers to certain patterns and ideas over others. Orientations, as both Ahmed and
Mays show, are not built exclusively through human, rational channels, but are also molded
through the mattering of a table and the vicissitudes of the writing process. Like these other
studies of orientation, Burke’s work shares that elemental commonality: sustained attention to
the non-rational factors involved in making meaning of and in the world.
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With orientation, Burke rooted his study of the non-rational in the sensation of vision, the
sense that is perhaps most associated with abstraction and objectivity. Rhetorical scholars Sonja
K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin critique abstraction when they remark that Burke’s rhetorical
theory lends itself to “an objective stance” in which “the rhetor engages in rhetorical processes
often as a substitute for experience,” (343-4). Yet the intertwining of biology with rhetoric in his
writing suggests that for Burke there was no separation between sensing an experience and being
there. As Hawhee explains in Moving Bodies, Burke’s references to the body in his writing were
far from abstract and were instead rooted in his experience working in a drug laboratory and
exploring bodily systems of digestion, neurology, and even dance. Such “biological processes,”
Hawhee notes, “are, for Burke, often and everywhere folded into interpretative, critical, and
ultimately rhetorical acts” (Moving Bodies 91). Orientation—because of the study of optics that
underpins it—turns even more explicitly to the minutiae of biological processes to explain how
the body codes and responds to information through the sensation of sight.
Burke’s explication of the biology of vision in Permanence and Change emphasizes that
perspective is more than a theoretical “lens” by which to see something in a new way. Instead,
vision is the sensory work of orientation. In this way, vision is rooted in lived experiences, or in
certain “characters’” emergence from the background of experience, a characterization that
Burke derived—at least in part—from the theories of Gestalt. To define it in its scientific, Gestalt
sense, orientation is the automatic grouping of disparate perceptual information into cognitive
wholes. Any stimulus, word, or event that individuals encounter is filtered through their
orientations: people can only see what their orientations allow them to see. Or as Burke himself
defines orientation: a “system of meanings, an altered conception as to how the world is put
together” (Permanence and Change 81). Rhetoric scholars have understood orientation as how a
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worldview coalesces. Yet, Burke was also interested in what a worldview is missing when he
theorized orientation. Rather than a metaphor for explaining how individuals look at the world
through a certain lens, orientation is built with the Gestalt idea of the brain’s mechanism for
creating relationships—at the exclusion of what does not seem to belong—during sensory
perception. If orientation is the brain’s way of grouping information, then vision becomes a
“test” to expose those grouping mechanisms, so as not to stay subordinated to them.
While Burke famously detested psychology, he viewed Gestalt, which emerged in the
1920s through the work of Wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Koffka, and Max Wertheimer in Germany, as
“a more useable extension” of behaviorist experiments (Rueckert 214). Gestalt, which taught
how the brain creates wholes from scattered sensory stimuli, was central to his description of
orientation, as Burke regularly explained scientific experiments through the use of “characters,”
or what elements are brought together into a cohesive whole. Consider Burke’s “characters” as
the constituents of gestalts—the parts that make the whole act that is human drama. As seen
when Burke presents Pavlov’s famous ringing bell experiment via Gestalt, orientation is
explained as a bundle of characters:
A ringing bell is a multiplicity of events interpreted as one thing [for example,
various materials, component vibrations, etc.] . . . . In a general way, we might
say that events take character by a “linkage of outstanding with outstanding” (as
the outstanding sound of the bell, in linkage with the outstanding experience of
the food, imparted to the bell a food-character for Pavlov’s dogs). The
accumulation and interworking of such characters is an orientation. It forms the
basis of expectancy—for character telescopes the past, present, and future. A sign,
which is here now, may have got a significance out of the past that makes it a
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promise of the future. Orientation is thus a bundle of judgments as to how things
were, how they are, and how they may be. (Permanence and Change 13-14)
Here Burke described the tendency of the brain to create “characters” and interpret experiences
in relation to those characters. Notice that characters “telescope” or compress data into bundles
and stand in metaphorically for orientations. Knowing that these orientations derive from the
biological process of sight, we can consider them as sensory bundles that allow individuals to
feel and intuitively understand instantaneous experience. For example, a spectator may arrive at
a political speech and experience a bodily, affective response to the scene. Perhaps the phrases
written on signs, the music playing over the speakers, the colors worn by others, the number of
bodies sharing a space—not to mention the words being spoken—layer to create what will be
experienced as a cohesive response. Each element is a character working together to perform the
spectator’s orientation to that scene. Orientation, then, is the way that a symbol-using animal
sorts information into meaningful relationships—but this sensing package (the notion of what
goes with what) is not pre-determined or universal. Rather, it is created through the accrual of an
individual’s bodily and sensorial experiences, which explains why two spectators can go to the
same political event and have markedly varied responses. All the world is certainly a stage, and
each individual is oriented to that stage through their own unique collection of characters.
Though never cited, it is clear that one particular text—Bruno Petermann’s The Gestalt
Theory and the Problem of Configuration (1932)—influenced, and may have been Burke’s
primary source of, his understanding of Gestalt “characters” as he drafted Permanence and
Change. In a 1934 letter to Malcolm Cowley, Burke listed Petermann’s The Gestalt Theory at the
top of a list of books that he considered to be the most neglected of the 1930s. Burke’s placing
Petermann’s text at the top of his list of “neglected books” helps to explain why Burke defined
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orientation so thoroughly in terms of Gestalt. A
personal copy of Petermann’s book at Burke’s
Andover, New Jersey estate reveals the
passages Burke highlighted that explicate how
vision works, or how sensory patterns—a sense
of what goes with what—emerge. What Burke
encountered in Petermann was a comprehensive

Figure 1. Replica of Wolgang Kohler’s
“Phenomenon of Closure” Sketch (Petermann
143).

overview of many versions of Gestalt theory, an overview that privileges the sensory and bodily
implications of researchers’ results over the details of their “laboratory work.” The textual figure
that garnered Burke’s attention was Kohler’s discovery of “‘gestalten’ in . . . optical perception”
(139) manifested through the drawing of black lines—set apart by varying distances—on a white
sheet of paper (see Figure 1). From this drawing, Kohler concludes that the brain forms groups
(gestalt) even when presented with only parallel lines. In his notes surrounding this figure, Burke
interpreted the findings of the three pairings as the brain’s ability to create “groups by nearness,
enclosing, [and] likeness,” as seen respectively in Figure 1. This particular figure allows readers
to sort differing elements into synthesized wholes at a glance. Indeed, Petermann presents The
Gestalt Theory to explain “how it is possible for a whole to arise out of the elements” (4).
Gestalt, in other words, is the cohering of disparate parts into a whole and the gestalt problem is
how the brain creates such cohesion. Orientation, then, is a gestalt—a sensory whole—or a
bundle of bias that may not so easily be changed. And as the explanation of individuals’
perceptual “whole” through which they navigate their material and symbolic environments,
orientation employs the idea of gestalt, but it also contains the mechanism for identifying the
automatic, and possibly problematic, interpretation therein.
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With a basis in visual gestalt, orientation reveals how deeply image is rooted in
experience and how such experience is key to understanding human motives. “Our orientation
largely involves matters of expectancy,” Burke insists, and “the subject of expectancy and the
judgment as to what is proper in conduct is largely bound up with the subject of motives, for if
we know why people do as they do, we feel that we know what to expect of them and of
ourselves” (Permanence and Change 18). A tension exists, then, at the heart of Burke’s
orientation. Rhetorical critics cannot know motives without knowing why people code
information as they do. But they cannot know why people code information the way that they do
because such coding is rooted in past experiences. Orientation thus becomes a situated standpoint
that is bound up in how one’s senses automatically interpret the world. In Permanence and
Change, Burke further details two mechanisms that hold individuals’ orientations in place: piety
and trained incapacity. Piety forces individuals to interpret information according to what fits
with their present orientations (Permanence and Change 74). Rhetoric scholar Jordynn Jack
explains pieties as “deeply entrenched embodied habits” (458), which ensure that anything
incongruous to one’s orientation is considered impious. The inability to interpret information that
falls outside of orientation’s purview is what Burke called trained incapacity, echoing Thorstein
Veblen: it is “that state of affairs whereby one’s very abilities can function as blindnesses”
(Permanence and Change 7, emphasis added). Essentially, past ways of understanding can
prevent individuals from seeing the world anew in the present.
From Gestalt theory, Burke learned that once a perceptual whole is established, it is
unnoticeable to individuals and difficult to displace. In Permanence and Change, Burke offers
walking as one example:
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The child gradually learns certain lowest common denominators of bodily
balance, certain coordinations which apply in a general way to any act of
walking. After he has learned to walk, even many years after he has become an
accomplished walker, if you put him in a new situation, the abstractness of his
walking becomes apparent. He has learned a certain kind of walking that is
adapted to floors and streets, for instance, but poorly adapted to rough
mountainsides—or the skilled sailor, having learned to walk by taking the roll of a
ship into account, rolls when on firm ground. (Permanence and Change 105)
Orientations, then, are unconscious, general gestalts that become apparent when they no longer
fit present sensory experiences.
Whereas Burke later attempted to uncover the motives of systemic cultural issues, that
inquiry began with an investigation into orientation, and the compression of sense-bundled
characters. The minutiae of the senses becomes an integral element of any rhetorical encounter,
and rhetorical analysis becomes a way to uncover all that gets lost in the translation from part to
whole. While Gestalt psychology explains how the brain creates wholes, or gestalts, it does not
quite determine how individuals interpret meaning from those wholes, a lesson for which Burke
would have to turn to optical science.
Sensing Orientation and Helmholtz’s Theory of Signs
The precursor to vision as individual and embodied may be found in the work of
Helmholtz, who Burke relied upon when he described sensation as vital to rhetorical work.
Helmholtz was a groundbreaking figure of the mid to late nineteenth century whose research and
inventions forever changed ophthalmological practice, cementing his status as “one of
Germany’s and the world’s spokesmen of science” (Cahan xi). Perhaps his most productive
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contribution to science was his invention of the ophthalmoscope, which allowed researchers to
“observ[e] the living retina” for the first time, an updated version of which is still used in
ophthalmological practices today (Cahan xii). Christina Walter’s Optical Impersonality details
Helmholtz’s impact on the American scientific vernacular and understanding of the body; she
suggests that Helmholtz helped to dismantle the Cartesian notion of an autonomous mind that
received faithful records of visual images from the eye. By exposing the material density of the
retina, Helmholtz’s research on the eye allowed “the truth of vision [to become] grounded in the
density and materiality of the body” (Walter 8). Helmholtzian vision, then, marked a disorienting
moment for modernist writers—like Burke—as this science of vision rooted in the body
simultaneously unlocked the fallibility of the senses and the strangeness of perception. Thus,
sensation becomes elemental to rhetoric in that it invites affect, materiality, and feeling into how
words and other “rational” texts, speeches, and artifacts come to mean, a principle presupposed
in Burke’s crafting of orientation.
The discussion of how sensation interacts with the material world in optical science
speaks to the interanimation between signs and matter. In this way, Permanence and Change
finds the source for a semiotics that rests below symbolicity in an unlikely source: Helmholtz. In
his 1978 essay “(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action,” Burke cites Jeremy Bentham: “Our
ideas coming, all of them, from our senses, . . . from what other source can our language come?”
(812). Burke thus presents sensation as the constitutive glue that connects nonsymbolic motion to
symbolic action, bringing our bodies to feel meaning and our symbols to carry affect.
Nearly fifty years prior to that essay, in Permanence and Change, Burke had distilled
Helmholtz’s theory of sensation: each sense is defined as a “character” that plays its own partial
rendition of an entire performance. Before explaining the rhetorical work of the senses, Burke
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reiterates how differences come to be organized into wholes by offering the example of fires and
acids: because both substances burn, we assign a “burn-character” to them, which Burke
interprets as “an ideality” or “a synthesis” (Permanence and Change 106). The danger of this
synthesizing classification system, Burke warns, is that individuals come to overlook “the many
important differences” (106) between the separate elements. He further offers the example of the
litmus test that “judges whether a chemical is acid or alkali by registering red or blue” (106).
Because of its automatic classification system, the litmus test “can classify in no other way”
(106). Importantly, this limiting process derives from language. To classify “acid” or “alkali” by
“red” or “blue” is to apply humanly constructed symbols onto natural phenomenon; once these
symbols come to represent “acid” or “alkali,” scientific observers register information no other
way. In this way, Burke demonstrates how language restricts individuals’ understanding of the
world: because symbols inevitably classify information, we can never know what exists outside
of these classifications.
These classifications, however, are not limited to symbol systems; they are embedded
into bodily habits at the level of sensation. Relating the way that the senses classify information
back to the litmus test, Burke explains:
Our senses themselves are similar abstractors, abstracting or interpreting certain
events as having a sound-character, a taste-character, a heat-character, a sightcharacter, etc., for as Helmholtz pointed out, our very sensory equipment is a set
of recording instruments that turn certain events into a certain kind of sign, and
we find our way through life on the basis of these signs. (Permanence and
Change 106)
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In this passage, Burke distinguishes sensory signs from linguistic symbols, yet he determines that
“signs” at the level of sensation commit the same errors as symbols: they classify by discarding,
missing, or overlooking much of what is perceived. To reiterate his point, Burke closes this
discussion of signs by ruminating on sensory excess. “There are events,” Burke explains, “not
interpreted at all by our sensory equipment, ultra-violet rays for instance” (Permanence and
Change 106-7, emphasis added).
Indeed, even though the brain registers only a sliver of the information the senses receive,
individuals feel as though what they experience is an all-encompassing representation of reality.
As Helmholtz states, “This daily verification by our other senses of the impressions we receive
by sight produces so firm a conviction of its absolute and complete truth that the exceptions
taken by philosophy or physiology, however well grounded they may seem, have no power to
shake it” (130). That is, individuals trust what their brains tell them about what their bodies
experience. Helmholtz was adamant that the senses do not give a true representation of the
external environment; rather, they fill in gaps to create a synthesized whole (165). This
representation of reality is an abstraction, Helmholtz explains, and people form this abstraction
because the brain registers sensory information by generating hypotheses about incoming
information then testing those hypotheses in conjunction with the other senses. Because
hypotheses are constantly tested and confirmed in the waking world, individuals come to
assume, rather unconsciously, that their senses are infallible in representing the material world.
In Burkean terms, orientations are neurologically rooted and shape how individuals navigate
their daily experiences.
Burke acknowledges that the brain creates unique signs for each sense, but for him this
acknowledgment indicates that the source of our faulty perception is not in the material world
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but with the mechanistic way that the brain creates signs. Helmholtz insists that signs are only
effective when they denote constants; a good sign, then, must “be constant,” “always denot[ing]
the same object” (168). This idea of constancy matches up with Burke’s assignment of each
sense with its own “character.” Though Helmholtz and the Gestalt theorists in Petermann’s text
championed the brain’s ability to receive all of the contradictory information from the senses and
then to unify this information into a whole that the brain could easily process and understand
through signs, Burke did not. Rather, he uses this aspect of the brain to reinforce his thesis on
orientation: when the brain creates a whole, it fails to examine the many parts comprising this
whole, disabling individuals from learning new things and altering their perspective of the world.
Orientations, then, are certainly partial, but they inevitably construct the bodily,
cognitive, and cultural system through which we communicate (and miscommunicate). For
Burke, when the brain’s system of signs work, they serve to help individuals see the world in
new ways and communicate their discoveries with others; when they falter, only classifying
information in rote constants, they work as neurological ruts. Further, once these ruts have been
established, the brain can “classify in no other way” (Permanence and Change 106). Working
with Helmholtz’s definition of signs, Burke observes that “we find our way through life on the
basis of these signs” (106). In other words, people understand the world via signs that are full of
incongruities. The problem is not that they have these incongruities—Helmholtz proves that
these will always exist within the senses—but that they do not realize they have these
incongruities, leaving them unaware of the shortcomings inherent to their signs. The brain, then,
is the structure holding individuals’ orientations in place, presenting the world as a performance
never called into question. Unless, of course, the automatism can be stopped through some
disruption of the senses.
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Perspective by Incongruity as a Reorientation Tool
Precisely because orientation is a way of seeing, it can only be discovered through the
same process of seeing. This attribute of Burke’s orientation, as Stroud explains, has troubled
rhetorical critics: why place the mechanism of change within the system filled with
incongruities? (62). Burke explained the answer, defining “perspective by incongruity” as the
antidote to his diplopia back in 1980:
I diagnosed the situation thus: When speculating on the resources of the term
“double vision” at the same time that I was shifting my perspective on my own
books on perspective, I began seeing double . . . I clearly “solved” the dizzying
formal problem [with] the Nietzschean theme of “transvaluation” [the basis of
perspective by incongruity] . . . . My recovery followed forthwith—and you can’t
imagine what a truly sybaritic delight it was, to look down the road and see just
one car coming. (Attitudes Toward History 399)
The ailment was his orientation as a rhetorical critic. Becoming enmeshed in the fallibility of the
senses and performing rhetorical analysis to investigate how signs and symbols work in and on
the body had altered his eyesight. Perspective by incongruity is often taught as a tool of
rhetorical analysis or a rhetorical method to influence others, but Burke’s lived experience argues
for its use as a method of self-reflection necessary for the rhetorical critic, defined broadly here
as any analyst of a rhetorical encounter. If rhetorical critics are to view the bias of their own
senses, then such revelation must come through their senses. The key has to do with the nature of
attention. We are always embedded within a sensory scene; we sense that scene in new relief
when we shift our attention. Burke’s diplopia is one such example, and throughout Permanence
and Change trauma and irony are presented as other such sensory shifts. In other words,
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perspective by incongruity’s role in rhetorical criticism requires feeling one’s relation to world, a
type of sense-inflected self-reflexivity.
Rhetorical scholars have understood how perspective by incongruity works conceptually,
but not quite biologically—a difference that translates perspective by incongruity from a
universal rhetorical tool to an intimate encounter rooted in self-reflexive praxis. Recent studies of
perspective by incongruity have considered how the term might be used beyond Burke’s original
intentions. Communication scholars Lacy Lowrey, Valerie R. Renegar, and Charles R. Goehring
use perspective by incongruity’s traditional definition of “verbal atom cracking” to present
comedian Sarah Silverman as one who embodies “non-verbal atom cracking” that offers social
critique without confusing literal messages with personal points of view (64). Lowrey et al.’s
description of perspective by incongruity can be applied as either a critical heuristic or rhetorical
strategy. Michelle Gibbons proposes a third use for the term, as a “resource for theoretical
reflection” (7), which fits with its ties to optics, or with a consideration of perspective by
incongruity as a way of discovering the self’s sensory biases.
Considering that for Burke orientation is so heavily rooted in Gestalt psychology and
optical science, it is not surprising that Burke defines perspective by incongruity as “a way of
seeing two ways at once” (qtd. in Skodnick 10). To put it another way, perspective by
incongruity is a productive disorientation of the senses designed to break apart the seemingly
automated interpretation process of the brain’s ability to form gestalts. Burke’s intent with this
system of incongruous juxtapositions is that it would expose the brain’s entrenchments. He
designed perspective by incongruity to function as a mental heuristic capable of breaking apart
individuals’ neurologically entrenched orientations (a process he calls disorientation) and
rebuilding a better worldview (reorientation).
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Consider the example of a solider who experiences heightened sense attention and
subsequently a change in perception upon first entering combat. As Burke details, “The grass
became a more vivid green; each flower he passed seemed unusually beautiful; the song of birds
took on a new, more penetrating sweetness; and the clouds were not merely white, they were
miraculously white” (Permanence and Change 141). Other feats of physical and emotional
endurance are met with the same sensory shifts: mountain climbers report experiencing visions
as they approach the edge of an abyss, which Burke interprets as not generating merely from the
view, but from “the constant dread that animates them” (141). This is perspective by incongruity
not because the soldier or the mountain climber misremembers their experience; instead, it has to
do with the way that they are sensing the world in the first place. “The matter may not be one of
active forgetting,” Burke explains, “but may involve the nature of attention in the first place. We
are proposing that the metaphor be tentatively shifted from a legalistic one suggesting repression
to an optical one suggesting focus” (141, emphasis added). Terror and dread, for Burke, are
heightened emotions that can shift an individual’s attention, creating an experience of double
vision in which terror is met with beauty. Other examples of perspective by incongruity
throughout Permanence and Change include Surrealist art and Gothic literature, all of which
suggest that perspective by incongruity deals rhetorically in affective shifts rather than only
rational or logical appeals. Perspective by incongruity has been located in texts, speech, and
body language, but this reorientation device also appears in everyday encounters, in any event
that makes individuals pause, stare, reorient.

19
A return to archival evidence from Burke’s marked up copy of Petermann’s The Gestalt
Theory reveals the visual example that inspired Burke as he drafted Permanence and Change.
Figure 2 shows Petermann’s representation of the “inversion phenomenon” as an example of the
way that the brain transitions focus between the “figure” and the “ground” (160). Petermann
explains:
This figure reveals very impressively Figure 2. Example of the Inversion
Phenomena (Petermann 163).
how at one time one can see a row of
black T’s, and how thereafter, with a sudden reversal, a row of white leaves on a
black background, can appear. Titchener’s “explanation” of this phenomenon
makes use of the differentiation of various degrees of consciousness, which is
related to the old-fashioned concept of Attention. In his opinion, the emergence of
the T’s has a very simple cause: “The black T’s are on the upper level of
consciousness, while the rest is at a lower level”; and so, also, he imagines the
reversal to be easily explained; all that has occurred is merely a change in that
“level.” (163)
When Burke annotated Petermann’s text, he noted that “the nature of appearance [is] voluntarily
changeable” and that an individuals’ “disposition and attention [affect] perception of gestalt.”
Perspective by incongruity, then, functions as a
tool that allows the rhetorical critic to lose focus
of the dominant view (the T’s) for a brief moment
in order to view an alternative interpretation (the
leaves). In other words, perspective by incongruity brings a different view to the forefront of
attention, changing whether we look at the figure or the ground, the T’s or the leaves.
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Reorientation asks the rhetorical critic to practice diplopia, double vision for the sake of
not being beholden to a single orientation. We are never not oriented, but rhetorical critics should
never be oriented without purpose, without awareness of placement. The role of perspective by
incongruity is that we need orientation to get beyond orientation, or to orient otherwise. For
Burke, vision becomes rhetorical when it calls into questions our sensory paradigms and reveals
our orientations, when it asks the rhetorical critic to discover to what and to whom they are
oriented. Perhaps the most important element to becoming a rhetorical critic is attuning ourselves
to our biases—not knowing them objectively or ideologically, but feeling them sensorially.
Implications and Conclusion
I began this essay with the following question: how might we understand the materiality
and sensation of vision as rhetorical processes? Answering this question through Burkean
orientation has shown that thus far in rhetorical theory vision has been at its most rhetorical when
it lapses or slips. And rhetorical strategies like perspective by incongruity become tools for
inducing such lapses, forcing us out of neurotypical ruts, asking us to see and feel otherwise if
we are to be otherwise. Rhetoric scholar Jenny Rice, echoing Hawhee’s premise in “Rhetoric’s
Sensorium,” has made clear why rhetorical critics must attend to the senses, describing sensation
as “vital connective tissue within the act of communication” (35). My study of the biology of
vision further emphasizes the relationship between rhetoric and sensation, showing that
orientations unveil the connective tissue that is our senses. Rhetorical criticism is often about
understanding, if not unhinging ideological biases; my argument has been that it does so only by
getting in touch with the sensations and feelings that uphold those biases.
Although this study has centered on Burke’s foray into the science of orientation in the
1930s, recent scholarly and scientific studies of image confirm the foundational principles of
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Gestalt theory and the sensory semiotics of Helmholtz. In a review of neuroscience research,
visual communication scholar Ann Marie Barry reveals that images are processed more quickly
than words in the brain, which means that images are experienced emotionally or affectively
before they are known rationally (Visual Intelligence 18). In fact, as neuroscientist Michael
Gazzaniga explains, everything that is seen is actually fifty milliseconds old: “What we see is not
what is on the retina at any given instant, but is a prediction of what will be there. Some system
in the brain takes old facts and makes predictions as if our perceptual system were really a virtual
and continuous movie in our mind” (75). The affective and rational interpretations of image are
interrelated, of course, as the brain categorizes images according to past experiences, or the
memories of image that exist in the mind (Barry, “Perception” 93). Our instantaneous reactions
to images, then, have more to do with affective emotions sticking to past images, and
subsequently symbols, than with a present critical evaluation of what is seen. To put it another
way, while people may interpret symbols in similar ways based on shared sociocultural
assumptions, their affective attachments to those symbols are highly individualized and personal.
Sensing is an ongoing rhetorical encounter that occurs in non-rational channels, and rhetorical
criticism that is attuned to interpretation at the level of the senses must unpack the affective
connective tissue between non-symbolic affect and symbolic interpretation.
The theoretical discussion of sensation and rhetoric raises the question: how might
understanding the materiality and sensation of vision alter rhetorical criticism? Only by attuning
to the sensory underpinnings of orientation can rhetorical critics consider the affective weight
that sticks to certain symbols over others and repetitively brings them to the forefront of
attention. Take, for example, one visual artifact of President Trump’s campaign rallies—red
trucker hats—as a helpful distillation of how this science of orientation might alter a rhetorical
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analysis of presidential visual rhetoric. In his review of how visual images function in political
communication, communication studies scholar Dan Schill indicates that visual analyses of
presidential and political images have focused primarily on prearranged snapshot moments and
contextual analysis of why those moments have public impact. In this vein, rhetoric scholar
Keith V. Erickson’s landmark study of the visual turn in presidential rhetoric traced Clinton’s
visual snapshots at Monticello, the Lincoln Memorial, and the Liberty Bell prior to his
inauguration (141). Such visuals “synoptically link a president to sites, rituals, and occasions that
serve as markers of culture, power, and/or authority” (Erickson 141). Although contextual
analyses of the cultural weight of the sites and symbols appearing in political and presidential
visuals is still necessary, this study of orientation asks critics to consider more minute, repetitive
details—such as the red trucker hats—that jump across visual snapshots and contexts, details that
enter our rhetorical purview less from their contextual weight and more from their sensory affect.
When Trump’s red trucker hat with the slogan “Make America Great Again” first hit the
campaign trail in July 2015, it was considered mostly as a joke. That season The New York Times
Style section gave the hat its due, dubbing the “old-school, wide-brimmed rope hat” as “the
ironic must-have fashion accessory of the summer,” an artifact that was showcased during
Fashion Week but whose appeal none could seem to describe (Parker). Then, The New York
Times predicted that the red trucker hat would “go the way of ‘on fleek’” (Parker), but four years
later the hat maintains a prominent role in the Trump presidency’s visual archive. The red hat, of
course, cannot be divorced from its memorable slogan, which Schill and Rita Kirk have linked
with nostalgia, citing a focus group of undecided voters polled during the 2016 election (10661067). Yet the hat exceeds the rationality (or lack thereof) of Trump’s campaign, being
purchased and worn by both Trump supporters and leftist critics “as a joke” (Cochrane).
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Understanding this visual artifact requires the rhetorical critic to query the non-rational minutiae
by which such hats appeal to the senses. Barry explains that “such simple stimuli as color alone .
. . can create emotional bias before conscious judgment is formed” (Visual Intelligence 21), and
ophthalmologists Michael F. Marmor and James G. Ravin conclude that the eye’s primary
interpretative trait is to code on contrast. Rather than registering the actual brightness of objects,
the eye quickly analyzes edges and judges what objects contrast most starkly with others
(Marmor and Ravin 31). In this way, a red trucker hat stands out in stark contrast to other now
muted colors of a scene. Or to use Gestalt terminology: when the eye codes the visual field into
perceptual wholes, the red trucker hat almost instantaneously emerges as what does not fit with
the rest of the scene. Color psychologists denote the color red as evoking feelings of energy,
strength, and aggression that demand a physical response, raising the pulse and activating “fight
or flight” instincts (Clarke and Costall 407; Labrecque and Milne 714; Valdez and Mehrabian
407-408). And whereas such research reveals shared sensory reactions to the red trucker hat, it
also leaves room to consider the individualized affective responses such a visual artifact might
evoke.
Observing the rhetorical affect of color through this particular visual artifact is in keeping
with communication scholars Brian L. Ott and Greg Dickinson’s call to analyze the Trump
presidency according to the rhetorical canon of style. Because Trump fails to issue logic-based
rhetorical appeals, Ott and Dickinson propose that rhetoric scholars must study style’s affective
appeals, which are “rooted in aesthetic expression and direct sensory experience rather than
symbolicity and representational systems of thought” (3). Moments of rhetorical style, they
further insist, create an “affective invitation” to which each individual body responds differently
based on “that body’s memories and tendencies” (Ott and Dickinson 4). The affective
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dimensions of Trump’s rhetoric explain how the bodies of Trump followers experience different
visceral reactions than Trump dissenters to visual artifacts like the red trucker hat. The hat,
communication scholar Anna M. Young argues, becomes a visible marker of in-group
membership that transfers the “Trump brand” experienced at campaign rallies—which entails but
is not limited to a “negative view of diversity and a fear of immigration”—to the wearer (28; 32).
Political theorist William E. Connolly further details that the “affective contagion” of Trump’s
rhetoric produced during these rallies does not provide the same “visceral register” outside of
those crowd settings (29). In other words, the red trucker hats accrue their affective contagion
from the style of the rally and, when worn, transfer Trump followers back to their collective rally
experience. Dissenters, as Young explains, experience quite a different visceral response: “Like
the MAGA red hat, these rallies are not for everyone. Some look at these rallies and see and hear
echoes of other demagogic leaders and incitement to violence. Others, though, see America as
they remember it or as they wish it to be” (34). Burke himself reminds that “orientation can go
wrong” because “the devices which we arrive at a correct orientation may be quite the same as
those involved in an incorrect one” (Permanence and Change 6-7). The ability to reorient
requires not just interpreting the signs around us, but to “interpret our interpretations”
(Permanence and Change 6), to observe how and why our senses are coding in the way that they
are.
Attuning to sensation in rhetorical criticism in this way asks that we acknowledge all
rhetorical critics as sensory beings, beings who are never abstract, theoretical observers but
always bodily, sensory participants with individualized affective responses. Rhetorical criticism
committed to studying individualized, affective responses discloses the critic’s own orientation
and thus reaction to the object of study, so as not to reinforce the idea of critical perspective as
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critical distance. To be clear, this disclosure is not the critic’s situated identity but affective
reaction to the work. In the case of Trump’s red trucker hat, I am certainly not immune. On a
recent family visit to southern Louisiana, I spent five full minutes in a restaurant line staring at a
tall white man wearing a red hat in front of me. This hat excited a visceral response—I have no
doubt my blood pressure rose as my “fight” instinct kicked in. Anger and frustration increased as
I debated whether I was complicit for not saying something, for not visibly showing my disgust.
It was then that he turned around and revealed a hat with “Tamko” (a roofing company) stamped
on the front. This moment revealed some of the sensory responses inherent to my orientation—in
this case, a response that led to a faulty conclusion. For others, the visceral response may have
been pride, a shared identification with Republican red. The point is that the eyes may lead us to
a place where the mind may not necessarily follow, and it is the job of rhetorical critics to
consider how perceptual coding may lead to conceptual slips. Through this revised theory of
orientation, this example shows how elements that appeal to the senses like color can contain the
shifting, oscillating meaning of symbols.
Such querying of sensory orientations to possibly reorient ourselves requires the act of
critical imagination. Presenting new tools of feminist rhetorical analysis in Feminist Rhetorical
Practices, Jacqueline Jones Royster and Gesa E. Kirsch describe “critical imagination” as a
method that allows rhetorical critics to “think between, above, around, and beyond [existing]
evidence to speculate methodically about probabilities” (71). In doing so, critical imagination
teaches us to “attend to our own levels of comfort and discomfort . . . . to attend the twofold
challenge of being aware, not only of what enters our field of vision—what we see and
recognize—but attuned also to our blind spots in order to consider with critical intensity what
may be more in shadow, muted, and not immediately obvious” (Royster and Kirsch 76). In a
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continual querying of the senses, returning to a scene to ask which sensory details may have been
overlooked, unnoticed, discarded, or—as is the case with the red trucker hats—which sensory
details are most pronounced across snapshot moments, rhetorical critics ensure that critical
imagination may reorient us, pulling us from perceptual biases. Reorientation, then, requires a
perceptual rupture, a suspension of perceptual automatism, making vision at its most rhetorical
when it alters the sensory makeup of our orientations and allows us to code otherwise. That
reorienting moment may come with the viewing of a roofing hat or through something more
deliberate like knitted pink “pussyhats” that emerged in the 2017 Women’s March on
Washington. Serving as a foil to the red trucker hats, the pink pussyhats produce the
“simultaneously unifying and antagonistic” effect as its counterpart (Kurtzleben). Because the
volatility of the present political climate extends beyond words into visual artifacts—artifacts not
relegated to monumental sites but that appear in everyday encounters—rhetorical critics must
attune themselves both to the colors, affects, and sensations that bring meaning, symbolic and
otherwise, to those artifacts and to the orientations from which those sensations arise.
Orientation is a promising term already in our rhetorical vocabulary that speaks to the
affective milieu in which sensory and symbol systems are bound. But we need not approach
orientation—and sensory elements like color to which it draws our attention—only through
Burke. Orientation is a Gestalt term, a feminist term, a posthuman term that stems from the nonrational. Rhetorical scholars may have an orientation towards Burke, but we can learn to see
otherwise through that orientation. We might now follow orientation‘s other roots to trace how
objects come to acquire their affective appeals, to consider how to access more fully feelings and
affect in scenes of visual rhetoric, to query further how vision might function differently in
rhetorical studies if rooted in biology and disconnected from its abstract connotations. We might
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stop to feel how it is our sensory reactions to the material world connect body to word, motion to
action, feeling to meaning.
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Figures

Caption: Figure 1. Replica of Wolgang Kohler’s “Phenomenon of Closure” Sketch (Petermann
143).

Caption: Figure 2. Example of the Inversion Phenomena (Petermann 163).

